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1. See, e.g., Fuchs, Differences in Hourly Earnings Between Men and Women, Monthly
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empirical finding that earnings are higher in traditionally male occupa-
tions than in predominantly female or integrated occupations. Human
capital differences2 in education and training between individuals explain
only some of this earnings differential.3 Most economists would agree that
the unexplained portion is largely due to discrimination; thus, increasing
women's access to nontraditional occupations should help to increase
their earnings.
Before we can reduce occupational segregation, however, we must
change the behavior that causes it. A law that prohibits and provides
incentives to reverse that behavior can effectively lessen the extent of
segregation. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits behavior
that economic theories of discrimination suggest is the cause of occupa-
tional segregation by sex. Since Title VII has been enforced for more than
a decade, we can expect to see it working. Direct empirical evaluation of its
effects on occupational segregation would show if this has been the
case.
One approach would be simply to look at gross changes; if they are
favorable, we could argue that the law has been effective and if they are
unfavorable we could argue that the law has been ineffective. This method
was used in a widely cited report of the United States Commission on Civil
Rights and, to some extent, in a recent law review article on a related
topic.' But this approach is only a first approximation and need not yield
the correct answer. Forces for change other than the law have also been
operating during the same period. These other factors must be taken into
account by holding them constant in a statistical sense. 6
Lab. Rev.. May 1971, at 9; Oaxaca, Male-Femnale Wage Differentials in Urban Labor
Markets, 14 Int'l Econ. Rev. 693, 693-709 (1973).
2. Economists use the term "human capital" to describe the productive capacity of human
beings, that is, the skills, knowledge and abilities that enable one to be productive in a variety
of settings, especially in the workplace, but also in the home. For a more thorough
discussion, see, e.g., Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 Am. Econ. Rev., Mar.
1971, at 1.
3. Belier, Occupational Segregation by Sex- Determinants and Changes, 17 J. Hum.
Resources 371, 371-92 (1982).
4. 42 U.S.C § § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
S. U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Social Indicators of Equality for Minorities and Women
(1978); NoteEqualPay, Comparable Work, and Job Evaluation, 90 Yale LJ. 657 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Note].
6. Multiple regression analysis is generally used for this purpose. Speaking generally,
multiple regression analysis is a statistical technique for measuring or estimating the effects
of a particular factor on a particular outcome by holding other factors which might influence
that outcome constant "Multiple regression attempts to explain the variation in a dependent
variable in terms of the variation in each of a set of independent or explanatory variables."
W. Fairley & F. Mosteller, Statistics and Public Policy 144 (1977).
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Gross statistics suggest that "federal prohibitions against sex-based
discrimination in compensation have [been ineffective in reducing] the
disparity between the earnings of male and female workers in the United
States."' But, in addition to reflecting the impact of Title VII, the gross
statistics also reflect the effects of other factors working to increase the
earnings gap between men and women, and thus counteracting Title VII.
One such factor is the increased rate of entry of women into the labor
force. In general, new entrants into the labor market have lower skills and
command lower wages than those already in the labor market. Thus, at
least some of the continuing disparity between men's and women's gross
earnings is attributable to the disproportionate increase in the number of
women to men entering the workforce rather than to ineffectiveness of
federal policy.
We conclude that Title VII has proved somewhat effective in
narrowing the earnings gap between men and women. Despite the
relative lack of improvement in women's gross earnings during the
decade after Title VII became federal policy, regression estimates show
that Title VII's enforcement between 1967 and 1974 narrowed the sex
differential in earnings by about 7.1%.' If change were to continue
at this rate, it would take many years before this policy would eliminate all
effects of sex discrimination in the labor market. Nevertheless, it is
effective policy and should continue to be rigorously enforced unless we
find a better approach.
In this article we examine, from an economist's perspective, how
discrimination by employers may cause occupational segregation, how
Title VII can reduce occupational segregation by reversing discrimina-
tory behavior, and empirical estimates on how Title VII has affected
women's entry into nontraditional occupations.
I. Occupational Segregation by Sex and Earnings
In this study, we refer to "male occupations," or, when referring to
them with respect to women, "nontraditional occupations." This usage
results from attaching a sex label to certain occupations whose sex
composition differs from that of the labor force as a whole. For example,
we recognize engineers, physicians, carpenters, electricians, truck
drivers, and laborers as traditionally male occupations. We recognize
teachers, registered nurses, secretaries, typists, telephone operators, and
maids as traditionally female occupations.9 We define as male an
7. Note, supra note 5. at 658.
8. See Belier, Tise VII and the Male/Female Earnings Gap: An Economic Analysis, 1
Harv. Women's L J. 157, 169, 171 (1978).
9. Defining this term involves making an arbitrary choice, but a certain convention has
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occupation that is 5% more male than the labor force as a whole in 1960;
that is, one in which males held 72.2% or more of the jobs. According to
this criterion, 65.7% of all detailed (3-digit) Census occupa-
tions were male in 1960. Then we examine changes in the entry of women
into this set of occupations that were male as of 1960. Occupations
close to the cut-off point for our definition could cease to be "male" as
women enter them over time. But for purposes of this study, we continue
to define an occupation's label by its 1960 sex composition.
Gross statistics indicate that occupational segregation lessened
during the seventies. The proportion of working men and women
employed in male occupations in 1967, 1971, 1974, and 1977 are shown
in Table 1. These figures are computed from data taken from the Annual
Demographic file of the Current Population Survey (CPS) collected by
the United States Bureau of the Census and made available on Public Use
Tapes since 1968. The data refers to an individual's occupation during
the preceding year. Figures for 1967 and the 1970's are not directly
comparable because of changes in the Census' occupation codes in 1970
and data collection methods in 1971. Nevertheless, they show that during
the seventies the proportion of men employed in male occupations
remained unchanged while the proportion of women employed in them
gradually rose. These changes caused the gross sex differential in the
probability of being employed in a male occupation to decline by .042
from .670 in 1971 to .628 in 1977, or by 6.3% of the original
differential.
Economists have developed two competing theories to explain
occupational segregation. One view, developed in the context of human
capital theory, 0 argues that women choose traditionally female occupa-
tions because they plan to drop out of the labor force periodically to bear
and raise children and find that certain jobs accommodate such absences
better than others. ' In addition, some women may not have the education
or training required to enter some male occupations. ,2
arisen in the literature. Moreover, we tried other definitions in our empirical estimates and
found that the choice has little effect upon our conclusions.
10. See Schultz, supra note 2; G. Becker, Human Capital (2d ed. 1975).
11. Polachek, Occupational Segregation Among Women: Theory, Evidence, and a
Prognosis, in Women in the Labor Market 137 (C. Lloyd, E. Andrews, C. Gilroy eds.
1979).
12. It is possible that, in the past, women did not obtain the education or training required to
enter nontraditional occupations because they faced discrimination in educational insti-
tutions or in other institutions that provide training. Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972 prohibits sex discrimination in educational institutions. Consequently, at least
since 1972, it has been illegal to preclude women's access to the education needed to enter
nontraditional jobs. Because this would make their skills more suitable for male occupa-
tions, Title IX may enhance Title Vii's effectiveness.
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A second theory suggests that discrimination against women in the
labor market causes occupational segregation. Even after we control for
all measureable skill differences between men and women, a substantial
portion of the original occupational differential remains unexplained.
Many economists attribute this unexplained difference to sex discrimi-
nation. 3 A recent treatise on sex differentials observes that "[Economic
d] iscrimination actually occurs when women are treated differently than
men of equal productivity, either by being paid lower wages on the
average or by not being hired for some jobs."' 14 One theory explains wage
differentials as grounded in misinformation and employer uncertainty
about the comparative productivity of men and women.."
A related theory postulates that discrimination acts as a barrier to
women's entry into certain occupations, reducing the demand for women
relative to men. A reduction in demand implies that for every ten women
and ten men that an employer would hire otherwise, he will desire to hire
fewer than ten women and more than ten men. How many fewer will
depend upon the extent of his desire to discriminate, or "taste for
discrimination," 6 as well as on how much it costs him to do so. Not only
will these occupations become male-dominated, but the earnings of
women will be lower than those of men because employers will offer less to
women. Direct wage discrimination of this type is prohibited by the Equal
Pay Act" and by Title VII. Because this discrimination imposes an
artificial barrier on the supply of labor to these occupations, average
wages will rise and they will become artificially high-wage jobs. The
restrictions upon entry into this male sector force some women, if they
want to find employment, to crowd into occupations in which employers
do not discriminate against them, or discriminate less.' Crowding in this
other sector creates an excess supply of (female) labor which pushes
wages below what they would be in the absence of discrimination. ' 9
13. For a formal definition and discussion of the implications of such discrimination, see G.
Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (2d ed. 1971).
14. C. Lloyd & B. Niemi, The Economics of Sex Differentials 194 (1979).
15. "Statistical discrimination can occur either on the purely erroneous ground of
consistent underestimation of female productive capacities or if the average productivities
of men and women are actually unequal." Id. at 200.
16. One economist argues that if an individual has a"taste for discrimination," he must act
as ifhe were willing to pay something, eitherdirectly or in the form of a reduced income, to be
associated with some persons instead of others G. Becker, The Economics of Discrimina-
tion 49-50 (2d ed. 1971). Employers, fellow employees, and consumers could hold these
tastes and cause wage differentials to arise against women.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
18. This theory of occupational crowding was first developed in Bergmann. Occupational
Segregation, Wages and Profits When Employers Discriminate by Race or Sex, E. Econ.
I., Apr.-July 1974, at 103-10.
19. Because discrimination causes wages in the female sector to be lower than they
1983]
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To the extent that these theories are correct, occupational segre-
gation and the sex-based earnings gap will continue unless "tastes" for
discrimination decline and discriminatory behavior by employers.
employees and consumers lessens. Employers' perceptions about the
productivity of women should change as they acquire better information
about women's actual productivity or as women's productivity increases.
But, unless we can expect these changes to occur naturally, incentives for
change must be provided. Anti-discrimination laws promote change by
making discrimination more expensive for employers.
Anti-discrimination laws also have a "ripple effect," precipitating
collateral changes which reduce inequality without direct. governmental
intervention. Such laws rely for their success, not on catching all
violators, but on promoting behavioral changes. Thus, along with
eliminating particular discriminatory practices, enforcement of Title VII
should dispel erroneous presumptions about women's qualities and
capabilities as employees. One indication of a genuine reduction in sex
discrimination would be an increase in the employment ratio of women to
men in male occupations. In fact, the data represented in Table 1 do
reflect a small increase in this ratio during the 1970's.
II. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may be expected to reduce
discrimination against women in employment and diminish occupational
segregation by sex. The employment provision of Title VII prohibits the
use of sex as a hiring criterion by employers. 0 Statistically, this implies
that a firm may not be in compliance with the provision if its female to
male employment ratio is below the ratio of women to men in the available
pool of qualified labor. Firms may come into compliance by attempting to
hire a higher proportion of women at all wage levels than previously. To
otherwise would be. many people argue Title VII should be extended to prohibit this type of
pay discrimination. A well-documented case for this is made in Note, supra note 5, at 657-
80. In a recent decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held, five to four, that "the Bennett
Amendment does not restrict Title VIrs prohibition of sex-based wage discrimination to
claims for equal pay for.'equal' work." County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161
(1981).
20. Title VII § 703,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Section 703 of Tide VII provides: (a) It shall be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer-() to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual, with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex. or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify
his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
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the extent that firms respond in this manner, demand for women relative
to men increases in the labor market. This tends to increase the relative
employment and/or relative earnings of women. As long as some firms
change behavior to come into compliance with the law, and others do not
increase the extent of their violations, we should observe a decline in
occupational segregation and in employment discrimination against
women. These effects are simply the reverse of those caused by
discrimination described above; as such, the law is well-designed to
eliminate discrimination in employment.2'
The process by which Title VII is expected to affect behavior
involves a set of economic incentives. That is, the law imposes expected
costs upon firms that engage in discriminatory employment practices. If
the expected psychological and monetary costs of violation exceed the
costs of compliance, then a firm will voluntarily comply with the law.
Also, firms that engage inadvertently in subtle forms of discrimination
might voluntarily comply once they learn that such practices are
discriminatory and illegal. The Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC), created by Title VII, has the power to investigate
charges of discrimination and to attempt to settle them. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 197222 amended Title VII to grant the
EEOC the power to take a case to court if conciliation procedures fail.
Prior to 1972, only complainants could bring Title VII actions, a step
which could prove very costly for the individual. Now if conciliation fails,
,the employer is far more likely to end up in courL
Table 2 shows the number of employment cases filed annually
.rising to a peak in 1977.3 Part of this dramatic increase in the number of
Title VII cases reaching the federal district courts may be attributed to the
EEOC's new powers. Another part may be attributed to the 1972
expansion of coverage to include state and local governments and
educational institutions within Title VIrs definition of "employer." 2 The
costs of violation to employers depend upon both the probability that a
case will be pursued through each procedural phase and the actual costs
21. The law is less well-designed to eliminate wage discrimination. See Belier, supra note 8,
at 157-73; Belier, The Economics of Enforcement of an Antidiscimination Law: Ti1e VII
ofthe CivilRights Act ofl964, 21 J. Law & Econ. 359 (1978). Ifit is enforced as a quota, the
employment provision can have perverse effects in the long run under certain conditions.
See Heckman & Wolpin, Does the Contract Compliance Pogram Work? An analysis of
Chicago Data, 29 Indus. & Lab. ReL Rev. 544 (1976).
22. Pub. L 92-261,86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and
42 U.S.C.).
23. Because the magnitude of the increase in cases was declining prior to 1972, the possible
explanation of an increase in awareness of the law could not alone explain the changes
'observed.
24. Title VII S 701,42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
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incurred at each step along the way. Because the 1972 amendments
expanded Title VII's scope and increased the expected costs of violation,
we expect the law's effect to be larger after 1972.
III. The Effects of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
Table 3 presents the percentage effect of Title VII on the sex
differential in the probability of being employed in a male occupation
estimated by multiple regression analysis for the following periods:
(1) 1967-1971, representing the short-run effect of pre-
amendment enforcement;
(2) 1967-1974, representing the long-run effect of pre-
amendment enforcement, plus the short-run effect of post-
amendment enforcement;
(3) 1971-1974, representing the short-run effect of post-
amendment enforcement; and
(4) 1971-1977, representing the long-run effect of post-
amendment enforcement.2
The data reveal that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act increased
a woman's chances, compared to a man's, of being employed in a male
occupation, and that the 1972 amendments to Title VII augmented this
change. Enforcement of sex discrimination charges under Title VII
narrowed the sex differential in the probability of being employed in a
male occupation by about 6.2% between 1967 and 1974, and by about
8.3% by 1977. However, according to these estimates, none of this effect
occurred in the short run; there is no change in probabilities between
1967 and 1971. Thus, it appears that with respect to sex discrimination,
Title VII was effective primarily after 1972.26
The results suggest that the 1972 amendments to Title VII
significantly increased women's chances of entering nontraditional
occupations. Post-amendment enforcement of Title VII reduced the sex
25. This latter effect is only a partial one for this period since we have data on Title VIrs
enforcement through 1974 only. The methodology is discussed in the appendix.
26. There is probably some bias in the estimates, which compare 1967 data to data for 1971
or later, because the Census' occupation codes and some of their methods of collecting data
changed between the sixties and the seventies. A Census monograph by Priebe (1972) was
used to make the set of occupation codes comparable. 3. Priebe, J. Heinkel & S. Greene,
1970 Occupation and Industry Classification Systems in Terms of Their 1960 Occupation
and Industry Elements (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Technical Papers No. 26, 1972). His
data on the 1960 sex composition of the new 1970 codes were used for this purpose.
However, due to some changes in data collection methods in 1971 the data comparisons
between 1967 and later years must be viewed with caution.
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differential in the probability of being employed in a male occupation by
about 2.1% in the short run (1971-1974), and this effect grew to4.2%, or
twice the short-term effect, over the long-run (1971-1977). The long-run
effect (1967-1974) of pre-amendment enforcement (1967-1971) was
about the same." Estimates reveal that this increase was concentrated
disproportionately among the youngest category of women studied."
While our results indicate that enforcement of legislation pro-
hibiting sex discrimination can be effective in desegregating the
workforce, the change appears small when measured against the size of
the gap which remains. The second column of Table 3 shows estimated
reductions in occupational segregation as a percentage of the gross
difference remaining at the end of each period. The data demonstrate that
Title Vli's enforcement over seven years diminished sex-based occupa-
tional segregation by 13.2%. While this change is not insignificant, at that
rate it would take between 75 and 100 years for the gap to disappear and
for the job distribution to achieve complete integration. Even this
estimate may be unduly optimistic, because enforcement will tend to
eliminate the least resistant forms of discrimination first. As time passes it
will become increasingly difficult to eliminate all remaining vestiges of
discrimination. But it may be unrealistic ever to expect a completely
integrated occupational distribution; even absent discrimination, women
might choose different occupations or have different qualifications than
men.
There are several plausible explanations for Title VII's improved
effectiveness after 1972. The impact of statutory amendments has
already been cited. Another factor is Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments.2 9 Enacted in 1972, Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in
education. Earlier prohibitions against sex discrimination were limited to
employment. Pre-Title IX laws attacked sex discrimination only from the
demand side-that is, from the side of the employer-while leaving the
supply side unaffected. Clearly, Title VII's attack on employment
discrimination alone would be ineffective if educational discrimination
limiting the supply of women possessing needed skills went unchecked.
Thus, Title IX probably enhanced the efficacy of Title VII's prohibitions
against discrimination in hiring."
Similarly, changes in attitudes toward equality for women
advanced by the Equal Rights Amendment almost certainly contributed
27. Table 3 illustrates the total effect of enforcement (1967-1974); data corresponding to
the long-run effects of pre-amendment enforcement are incorporated therein.
28. Belier, The impact of Equal Opportunity Policy on Sex Differentials in Earnings and
Occupations, Am. Econ. Rev., May. 1982, at 171.
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
30. Belier, supra note 28.
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to the post-1972 decline in sex-based occupational segregation; as did the
United States Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Griggs v. Duke Power."'
Griggs put teeth into Title VII, holding that tests or criteria for
employment or promotion "must be shown to be related to successful
performance of the jobs for which they fare] used."3 2 After Griggs,
employment practices which operate to exclude a class of job applicants
and which cannot be shown to be related to job performance are
prohibited.3
IV. Conclusion
Using a statistical analysis which holds non-legislative factors
constant, we showed that enforcement of Title VII increased women's
entry into nontraditional occupations during the seventies, thereby
decreasing the extent of occupational segregation by sex. Most of the
effect occurred after 1972, the year in which several laws designed to
eliminate sex discrimination passed Congress and the year after the
United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Griggs v. Duke
Power. Thus, we conclude that under policies currently in effect, Title VII
helps women to enter nontraditional occupations. Compared to the size of
the existing gap, the effect is small but not insignificant. By increasing the
demand for women relative to men, Title VII may also reduce the earnings
differential between the sexes.
31.401 U.S. 424 (1971).
32. Gillette, Racial Discrimination in Unemployment, 12 Win. & Mary L Rev. 918, 919
(1970-1971).
33. 401 U.S. at 431.
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TABLE 1
Proportion of Working Men and Women Employed
in Male Occupations for 1967, 1971, 1974, and 1977
1967 1971 1974 1977
Men .604 .807 .805 .805
Women .087 .137 .153 .177
Sex differential .517 .670 .652 .628
SOURCE: US. Bureau of the Census, US. Census of Population: 1960.
Final Report PC(2)-7A. Subject Reports. Occupational Characteristics.
(Washington, D.C.: US. Government Printing Office, 1963), Table 1;
Current Population Survey, Annual Demographic File, 1968, 1972,
1975, and 1978.
NOTE: In moving from 1967 to the 1970s, we move from the 1960
Census 3-digit occupation codes to the 1970 codes. J. Priebe, 1970
Occupation and Industry Classification Systems in Terms of Their 1960
Occupation and Industry Elements (US. Bureau of the Census Tech-
nical Paper No. 26, 1972), enables us to make this transition; however,
the break in the figures in this table may reflect an imperfect reconcili-
ation with the increased number of occupational categories. For all
years, a male occupation is one in which men hold 72.2 percent or
more of the jobs.
TABLE 2
Number of Employment Cases Filed in Federal














SOURCE: The Administrative Office of the US. Courts, Annual Report of




The Net Percent Effect of Enforcement between 1967 and 1974
of Title VII on the Sex Differential in the Probability
of Being Employed in a Male Occupation,
1967-1977
As a percent of the
Period Effect remaining differential
1967-71 +.003ac 0.4
1967.74 d  -.062a~c  9.5
1971-74 -.02 1a 3.2
1971-77 -.042b 6.7
1967-77 -.083b c 13.2
aTaken from Beller, Occupational Segregation by Sex: Determinants and
Changes, 17 J. Hum. Resources 371,371-92 (1982).
bThis effect, computed from the author's unpublished data, is only a
partial effect for this period because the data on Title VII measure
enforcement only through 1974.
cThese estimates are subject to possible bias due to the change in the
Census occupation codes in 1970.
dThe effect for this entire period, 1967-74, is not the sum of the effects
for the periods, 1967-71 and 1971-74, which show short-run effects for
pre-amendment and post-amendment enforcement, respectively. It is
the sum of the long-run effect of pre-amendment enforcement (not
shown) and the short-run effect of post-amendment enforcement, Since
the long-run effect is larger, this figure is larger than the sum of the
other two.
[Vol. 1:73
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TABLE 4
Mean and Standard Deviation of Title VU Variables











SOURCE: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission computer files.
NOTE: The Title VII variables are computed for the 23 State groups identi-
fied in the Current Population Survey, separately for private wage and
salary and government workers. They are assigned to each individual on
the basis of State and class of worker.
Appendix
This appendix is intended to provide interested readers with an
appreciation of the basic statistical methodologies used in this study. The
complete equations upon which the empirical results presented in this
paper are based are available from the author upon request. Those
interested in a more detailed explication are referred to the following
related articles by the author.
Occupational Segregation by Sex: Determinants & Changes, 17 J.
Hum. Resources 371 (1982)
Title VII and the Male/Female Earnings Gap: An Economic
Analysis, 1 Harv. Women's L. J. 157 (1978)
The Economics of Enforcement of an Antidiscrimination Law:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 21 J. Law & Econ. 359
(1978)
The Impact of Equal Opportunity Policy on Sex Differentials in
Earnings and Occupations, Am. Econ. Rev., May, 1982, at 171.
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Once we understand how Title VII may be expected to affect
occupational segregation and how these effects may be measured, we
must construct a model to estimate those changes in occupational
segregation attributable to Title VII. In selecting an appropriate tech-
nique for estimating the model, we must determine how to measure
occupational segregation and we must identify and control for factors
other than Title VII which may affect occupational segregation
In addition to sex discrimination variables, we look at the indi-
vidual's decision to enter a male occupation as a function of skill, level of
commitment to the labor force, geographic location, and several other
control variables, including race. To a large extent, occupational dif-
ferences among individuals result from differences in education and on-
the-job training. The human capital model, which relates earnings to
individual investments in skills through education and on-the-job
training (see text at note 2), is adapted here to explain differences in entry
into male occupations. Commonly, years of experience in the labor
market is used to measure the effects of on-the-job training. But, when the
data provide information on potential rather than actual labor market
experience, we must supplement our experience measure with labor
supply variables. Variables such as number of hours or weeks worked in
the preceding year, marital status, and number of children serve as
proxies for the individual's degree of commitment to the labor market and
for the number of prior years not spent in the labor market. Similarly, we
control for differences in attitudes toward women working in the market
and occupational structure by controlling for region and urban-rural
residence.
The probability of being employed in a male occupation is defined
as equal to one if the person is so employed, and zero otherwise. We
believe that this is the appropriate specification for this study. An
alternative specification (the proportion of employment that is male in an
occupation) was rejected for the following reasons: we do not expect Title
VII to affect entry into the non-male occupations relative to one another,
nor, among male occupations, to have a larger effect upon the most highly
segregated ones. Rather, we interpret the law to group segregated-male
occupations as a single unit and treat them differently from other
occupations. This notion is best captured by a dichotomous dependent
variable.
The proportion of the Current Population Survey (CPS) samples
employed in male occupations for each sex is shown in Table I above. We
estimate the equations for each year and each sex by using ordinary least
squares regression analysis. We have chosen to use a linear probability
model to estimate these equations; when the dependent variable is binary,
as it is in our case, it is sometimes necessary to use a nonlinear estimation
technique, such as the logit. This maximum likelihood estimation can be
[Vol. 1:73
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very expensive on large data sets such as ours. When we used this
technique on one of our data sets, we found that the results were not
significantly different from those obtained using the less expensive linear
probability model.
The difference between coefficients estimated in each of two years
for the Title VII variables described below estimates the success of the law
in reducing barriers to the entry of women into nontraditional occupa-
tions. Through the use of coefficient differences, our methodology takes
account of both pre-existing relationships and systematic structural
changes related to enforcement of Title VII. Variation across states in
variables measuring Title VIrs enforcement should be positively related
to the probability of a working woman being employed in a male
occupation. A positive coefficient in a post-enforcement cross-section is
evidence of the success of Title VII as long as no relationship exists
between these variables in a pre-enforcement cross-section. Should a
prior relationship exist, estimates from a post-enforcement cross-section
alone would not provide such evidence. In this case, we must subtract
coefficients estimated in the pre-enforcement cross-section from the
comparable post-enforcement coefficients. Thus, the effect of enforce-
ment is actually measured by a difference over time in coefficients from
two comparable cross-sections, rather than by a coefficient estimate from
a single post-enforcement cross-section. Since the occupational structure
may change over time for other reasons, and these structural changes may
be systematically related to differences in Title VII's enforcement across
states, we also estimate the coefficients of Title VII on male data. Changes
across states in the occupational structure between male and other
occupations should be picked up by these coefficients since the in-
cumbents in these occupations are mostly male; we subtract them from
the comparable coefficients for females. Hence, our methodology in-
volves estimating and comparing pre- and post-enforcement cross-
sections for both males and females. The full model consists of equations
estimated on data from 1967 or 1971, prior to enforcement, and 1974 or
1977.
From our analysis of the process by which the law affects behavior
we construct two measures of the law's enforcement, essentially empirical
counterparts to the law. The expected costs of violating Title VII vary
across states, and were altered by the law's 1972 amendments. Two
variables are constructed for each of the two periods delineated by these
amendments to estimate expected costs: the probability of Title VII
violation charges, and the probability of paying a penalty if found in
violation of Title VII. The probability of violation charges is estimated by
the geographic incidence of EEOC investigations, the ratio of the number
of investigations of sex discrimination charges completed by the EEOC-
or by the state or local Fair Employment Commission to which a charge is
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deferred-to the number of women working during 1970. This variable
represents the visibility of enforcement activities, the more visible, the
greater its deterrent effect should be.
The probability of paying a penalty is estimated by the ratio of
successful (voluntary) settlements of sex discrimination charges (stc-
cessful conciliations plus successful pre-decision settlements) to at-
tempted (voluntary) settlements. Given the incidence of investigations,
the greater the probability of successful settlement, the greater is the
expected marginal penalty for discrimination and consequently. the
greater the expected effect of enforcement of Title VII. Both of these
enforcement variables are defined geographically for each of the twenty-
three state groups identified in the CPS, the main source for the
demographic data used in this study, and are defined separately for the
private sector and the government.
Some points need to be made about these variables and the data
used to construct them. First, the EEOC determines whether a settlement
is "successful" or "unsuccessful." Second, not all investigations or
settlements have the same potential impact. Around 30% of discrimina-
tion charges have been processed as "systemic," while the other 70%
have been processed as "limited scope." Those on systemic discrimina-
tion, defined by the EEOC as "employment 'systems' which perpetuate
discriminatory effects of past discrimination (even after the original
discriminatory acts have ceased) as opposed to overt 'acts' of discrimi-
nation," should have a greater impact. Because we cannot identify these
types separately, all charges must be treated alike for purposes of this
study. Third, there is some possibility of variation in the choice by the
EEOC of which complaints to settle. We ignore this possibility in defining
the variables because all investigated complaints in which there is a
finding of cause should be followed by an attempted settlement, and this
should be determined by the order in which the complaints are received.
The settlement variable is thus defined over cases where discrimination
appears to exist. Cases where discrimination does not seem to exist drop
out between the two measures. Finally, we would prefer to include among
settlements those that are litigated; however, this is not possible in our
data because the EEOC does not maintain a record of litigation activities
in its compliance file. To some extent the effects will be picked up by the
variable measuring the probability of successful settlement. Firms should
be more likely to agree to settlements in areas where the probability of
litigation and the costs of litigated settlements are higher.
Data on the 3-digit Census occupations of men and women and on
their economic and demographic characteristics are taken from the U.S.
Census Bureau's Annual Demographic File of the 1978, 1975, 1972 and
1968 CPS. All men and women who worked in the previous year, except
the self-employed, are included in the samples.
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